Post-Separation Failure to Support a Dependent Spouse as a Sole Ground for Alimony Despite the Absence of Marital Misconduct Before Separation - Brown v. Brown by Rich, Elizabeth N.
Campbell Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 3 Summer 1993 Article 5
January 1993
Post-Separation Failure to Support a Dependent
Spouse as a Sole Ground for Alimony Despite the
Absence of Marital Misconduct Before Separation -
Brown v. Brown
Elizabeth N. Rich
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth N. Rich, Post-Separation Failure to Support a Dependent Spouse as a Sole Ground for Alimony Despite the Absence of Marital
Misconduct Before Separation - Brown v. Brown, 15 Campbell L. Rev. 333 (1993).
POST-SEPARATION FAILURE TO SUPPORT A
DEPENDENT SPOUSE AS A SOLE GROUND FOR
ALIMONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF MARITAL
MISCONDUCT BEFORE SEPARATION - Brown v.
Brown.
INTRODUCTION
Upon separation and institution of a divorce action, a spouse
may also include an action for alimony.1 In order to receive ali-
mony after a final decree of divorce, the spouse attempting to re-
ceive alimony must plead and prove at least one of ten statutory
grounds of marital misconduct committed by the other spouse.2
These grounds are acts that must have caused or contributed to
the breakdown of the marriage.3
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8(b) (1987).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987):
(1) The supporting spouse has committed adultery.
(2) There has been an involuntary separation of the spouses in conse-
quence of a criminal act committed by the supporting spouse prior to the
proceeding in which alimony is sought, and the spouses have lived sepa-
rate and apart for one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the pro-
ceeding has resided in this State for six months.
(3) The supporting spouse has engaged in an unnatural or abnormal sex
act with a person of the same sex or of a different sex or with a beast.
(4) The supporting spouse abandons the dependent spouse. (5) The sup-
porting spouse maliciously turns the dependent spouse out of doors.
(6) The supporting spouse by cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the
life of the dependent spouse.
(7) The supporting spouse offers such indignities to the person,of the
dependent spouse as to render his or her condition intolerable and life
burdensome.
(8) The supporting spouse is a spendthrift.
(9) The supporting spouse is an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so as to
render the condition of the dependent spouse intolerable and the life of
the dependent spouse burdensome.
(10) The supporting spouse willfully fails to provide the dependent
spouse with necessary subsistence according to his or her means and con-
dition so as to render the condition of the dependent spouse intolerable
and the life of the dependent spouse burdensome.
3. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 187-88, 261 S.E.2d 849, 858-59
(1980).
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Brown,4 at-
tempted to broaden the scope of North Carolina General Statute
50-16.2, which lists the grounds for alimony, by holding that the
willful failure of the supporting spouse to provide support after the
parties separate, but before any action for alimony has com-
menced, is included in the language of the statute as a ground for
permanent alimony.5 The court made two errors in its opinion.
First, it incorrectly relied on the rationale that post-separation
adultery is a ground for alimony in deciding that post-separation
failure to support a spouse may also be a ground for alimony.6 Sec-
ond, the court failed to consider the detrimental effects such an
interpretation of the statute will have on future actions for ali-
mony. This Note explores the developments in the policy behind
awarding alimony, analyzes the rationale behind the court of ap-
peals' decision in light of these developments, and concludes that
future actions for alimony may be upheld where the supporting
spouse is not responsible for the dissolution of the marriage, a re-
sult inconsistent with the direction that the policy behind award-
ing alimony has taken in recent years.
THE CASE
Janet Ruth Brown, the plaintiff, and Elbert Ferrell Brown, the
defendant, separated on June 25, 1988.7 At the time of the separa-
tion, Mr. Brown told his unemployed wife that he would support
her until August 1988.1 At this time, Mrs. Brown attempted to re-
ceive disability benefits for her support, but was unsuccessful.9 Af-
ter August of 1988, Mr. Brown stopped sending support.10 Approx-
imately three months later, on December 6, 1988, the court entered
an order, pursuant to Mrs. Brown's September complaint, award-
ing her alimony pendente lite.11 Mr. Brown then resumed his sup-
port payments."2 Subsequently, on October 6, 1989, a judgment of
4. 104 N.C. App. 547, 410 S.E.2d 223 (1991), cert. denied, 331 N.C. 383, 417
S.E.2d 789 (1992).
5. Id. at 550, 410 S.E.2d at 225.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 549, 410 S.E.2d at 225.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 548, 410 S.E.2d at 224.
12. Record at 57, Brown (88-CvD-2593).
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absolute divorce was entered."3 On November 28, 1990, a hearing
on Mrs. Brown's permanent alimony claim was held.14 The court
gave the jury three questions to be answered as to what grounds
existed, if any, to support Mrs. Brown's claim for alimony., 5 The
jury found that Mr. Brown had neither abandoned nor offered in-
dignities to Mrs.Brown, without provocation on her part.18 How-
ever, the jury did find that Mr. Brown had willfully failed to pro-
vide Mrs. Brown "with necessary subsistence according to his
means and conditions so as to render [her] condition intolerable
and her life burdensome" based on the post-separation period dur-
ing which Mr. Brown did not pay support to Mrs. Brown.1 7 As a
result of this finding, the court granted Mrs. Brown an award of
permanent alimony.'8
Mr. Brown appealed the judgment, arguing that the court
should not have found in Mrs. Brown's favor because the jury, by
finding that Mr. Brown did not abandon or offer indignities to
Mrs. Brown without provocation, in effect found that Mr. Brown
was not at fault for the breakup of the marriage. 9 He further as-
serted that his post-separation failure to support Mrs. Brown could
not be a ground for alimony, as it was justified by her provoking
the end of the marriage.2
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence,
and affirmed the trial court's decision,2' partly based on the ration-
13. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 548, 410 S.E.2d at 224.
14. Id.
15. Record at 53. The questions presented to the jury were as follows:
(1) Did the defendant, Elbert Ferrell Brown, wilfully abandon the
plaintiff, Janet Ruth Brown, without just cause or provocation?
ANSWER: NO.
(2) Did the defendant, Elbert Ferrell Brown, wilfully fail to provide
the plaintiff, Janet Ruth Brown, with necessary subsistence according to
the defendant's means and condition, so as to render the condition of the
plaintiff intolerable and her life burdensome?
ANSWER: YES.
(3) Did the defendant, Elbert Ferrell Brown, without provocation,
offer such indignities to the person of the plaintiff as to render her condi-
tion intolerable and life burdensome?
ANSWER: NO.
16. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 548, 410 S.E.2d at 224.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 549, 410 S.E.2d at 225.
21. Id. at 550, 410 S.E.2d at 226.
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ale in Adams v. Adams,2" which held that adultery was a ground
for permanent alimony regardless of whether the spouse commit-
ted it before or after separation.
BACKGROUND
The North Carolina Legislature's policy objectives in enacting
North Carolina's alimony statutes are difficult to discern. The con-
fusion stems from the fact that there was no right to alimony upon
divorce at common law.2" The consensus of the common law courts
was that upon the dissolution of the marriage, all rights and obli-
gations of the marriage were terminated. 2 By the turn of the 19th
century, alimony could be granted without divorce, based on the
husband's duty to support his wife.2 5 However, the parties were
compelled to remain married in order for the wife to receive ali-
mony. Eventually, this sentiment surrounding the husband's duty
to support led to statutory allowance of alimony with divorce. 6
Recently, however, the right to such an allowance has been the
subject of much debate. Views about the moral and legal rights
and obligations of men and women are in a state of flux, with a
strong trend towards equality of the sexes in all aspects of life; in
marriage as well as business. 7
In recognizing and supporting the equality of the parties in a
marriage, North Carolina now bases the duty to support upon ei-
ther spouse.28 Also, North Carolina now has an equitable distribu-
22. 92 N.C. App. 274, 278, 374 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1988).
23. ROBERT E. LE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY Lcw § 140 (4th ed. 1980).
24. Id. See also Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E. 2d 118 (1946); Feld-
man v. Feldman 236 N.C. 731, 73 S.E.2d 865 (1953).
25. LEE, supra note 23, at § 140. For cases upholding a husband's duty to
support, see Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242,84 S.E. 265 (1915); State v. Lucas,
242 N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955); Perry v. Jolly, 259 N.C. 305, 130 S.E.2d 654
(1963); Jones v. Jones, 261 N.C. 612, 135 S.E.2d 554 (1964).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16 to -16.10 (1967).
27. LEE, supra note 23 ("Recently, courts and legislatures have mixed fu-
turistic ideas with historical notions. Growing antipathy to the whole concept of
alimony is easy to detect. Looking to married women's property acts and im-
proved employment opportunities for women, courts have attacked alimony as a
'free bread ticket for life.' Traditional judicial chivalry vis-a-vis the ("innocent")
divorcing wife is being replaced with attitudes that, at least in some cases, are not
free of vindictiveness. Invoking 'women's lib' as a fait accompli, some courts have
denied any alimony... A basic change in attitudes toward alimony is in the mak-
ing.") (quoting HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 28.2 (1977)).
28. North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471
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tion statute to provide equal division of the couple's property.29 In
the alimony context, neither spouse is deemed to presumptively
owe the other an absolute duty to support. Economic dependence
must be proven before alimony will be granted.30 This is true in
both temporary and permanent alimony actions.31
A. Temporary Alimony
Temporary alimony, or alimony pendente lite, may be
awarded to a dependent spouse while an action is pending for ab-
solute divorce, alimony without divorce, and other actions.32 There
are few requirements for the dependent spouse to meet in an ac-
tion for temporary alimony.33 The key requirement is an assertion
of dependence which must only appear to the judge to be meritori-
ous."3 The ultimate determination of the spouse's entitlement to
alimony and alimony pendente lite will be made with the final de-
termination of the original action. If the court then finds that the
dependant spouse was not entitled to the alimony pendente lite,
the support must be repaid."
The purpose of awarding this type of alimony in such haste is
to enable a dependent spouse to meet his or her personal needs,
and meet the other spouse on equal footing in the divorce proceed-
ings. 6 There may also be an urgency to the application if the de-
(1987).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1987):
(3) "Dependent spouse" means a spouse, whether husband or wife, who
is actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her
maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance and
support from the other spouse. (4) "Supporting spouse" means a spouse,
whether husband or wife upon whom the other spouse is actually sub-
stantially dependent or from whom such other spouse is substantially in
need of maintenance and support.
However, dependence is a relative term. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 83 N.C.
App. 228, 349 S.E.2d 397 (1986) (finding the wife to be a dependent spouse de-
spite the fact that her income exceeded that of her husband).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 to -16.3 (1987).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (1987).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3(a) (1987).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3(a)(1) (1987). See also LEE, supra note 23, at
§ 138.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.11 (1987).
36. Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299, 160 S.E.2d 13 (1968); Fogartie v. Fogartie,
236 N.C. 188, 72 S.E.2d 226 (1952); Black v. Black, 30 N.C. App. 403, 226 S.E.2d
858, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 775, 229 S.E.2d 31 (1976).
1993]
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pendent spouse has relied solely on the supporting spouse for ne-
cessities. Thus, an application for alimony pendente lite may be
made immediately upon commencement of the original action to
ensure the dependent spouse of subsistence throughout the
proceedings.37
B. Permanent Alimony
In addition to being based on economic dependence, perma-
nent alimony is based on fault. 8 One of ten enumerated grounds,
all based on marital misconduct, must be asserted and proved in
order for alimony to be granted.39 These same grounds may also be
asserted as affirmative defenses to a claim for alimony, and, if suc-
cessful, may reduce the amount of alimony or preclude the depen-
dent spouse from receiving permanent alimony altogether. °
One purpose behind basing permanent alimony awards on
fault stems from the notion that a supporting spouse whose mar-
riage has ended through no fault of his or her own, should not bear
the burden of supporting the one who caused or contributed to the
dissolution of the marriage.41 Following this logic, the North Caro-
lina courts have generally only considered misconduct that took
place while the parties were living together as husband and wife.
Thus, the misconduct must have contributed to the pre-separation
breakdown of their marital relations.42
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8(g) (1987).
38. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980); Stickel v.
Stickel, 58 N.C. App. 645, 294 S.E.2d 321 (1982). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.5(b) to -16.6 (1987). For a general discussion opposing fault bases in the di-
vorce and alimony context in North Carolina, see Patricia H. Marschall, Proposed
Reforms in North Carolina Divorce Law, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35 (1976). For a pro-
posed reformed statute that creates nonfault-based grounds for alimony, see Bar-
bara Heggie, Alimony Reform for North Carolina, 18 N.C. CENT. L.J. 87, 96
(1989).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. §8 50-16.5(b) to -16.6 (1987).
41. Parker v. Parker, 261 N.C. 176, 134 S.E.2d 174 (1964); Caddell v. Caddell,
236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923 (1953); Reece v. Reece, 232 N.C. 95, 59 S.E.2d 363
(1950); Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945); Skamarak v.
Skamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 343 S.E.2d 559 (1986); Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App.
554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985); Cavendish v. Cavendish, 38 N.C. App. 577, 248 S.E.2d
340 (1978); Self v. Self, 37 N.C. App. 199, 245 S.E.2d 541 (1978). But see Lemons
v. Lemons 22 N.C. App. 303, 206 S.E.2d 327 (1974) ("[a]limony is not awarded as
a punishment for a broken marriage. . ").1 42. See generally Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976) (uphold-
[Vol. 15:333
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Before Brown v. Brown, post-separation willful failure to sup-
port had never been asserted as the sole ground for alimony. Other
grounds for alimony had been asserted based solely on conduct
that took place after the parties separated.4 s However, only post-
separation adultery had been successfully pleaded as a ground for
permanent alimony.44 In Adams v. Adams the court justified its
finding of post-separation adultery as a sufficient ground for ali-
mony by asserting the state's interest in the marriage of its citi-
zens, and the encouragement of reconciliation until the last possi-
ble moment.45 On the other hand, other cases have concluded that
post-separation events involving abandonment, constructive aban-
donment and offering indignities to a spouse may not be consid-
ered as grounds for alimony.46 The reasons behind these findings
are that they are not probative of the issues surrounding whether a
spouse was at fault in ending the marriage, because acts that take
place after the parties have separated, when animosity may have
developed between the parties, are not indicative of marital
conduct.
ANALYSIS
The issue in Brown, according to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, was whether post-separation failure to support a depen-
ing an award of permanent alimony based on a finding of "specified marital mis-
conduct"); Panhorst v. Panhorst, 277 N.C. 664, 178 S.E.2d 387 (1971) (abandon-
ment is a ground for alimony if there is no pre-separation misconduct that would
justify the spouse's departure from the marriage); Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299,
160 S.E.2d 13 (1968) (finding that acts that caused the wife to consequently leave
home are sufficient grounds for alimony); McDowell v. McDowell, 243 N.C. 286,
90 S.E.2d 544 (1955) (wife was compelled to leave by husband's failure to provide
for her medical expenses during the marriage); Rayfield v. Rayfield, 242 N.C. 691,
89 S.E.2d 399 (1955) (willful failure to support upon abandonment constitutes
grounds for alimony); Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. 119, 362 S.E.2d 584
(1987) (constructive abandonment may not be based on evidence of action after
the parties have separated); Fogleman v. Fogleman, 41 N.C. App. 597, 255 S.E.2d
269 (1979) (finding that post-separation conduct was not probative of the issues of
abandonment or the offering of indignities).
43. Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C. App. 274, 374 S.E.2d 450 (1988); Ellinwood v.
Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. 119, 362 S.E.2d 584 (1987); Fogleman v. Fogleman, 41
N.C. App. 597, 255 S.E.2d 269 (1979).
44. Adams, 92 N.C. App. at 279, 374 S.E.2d at 453.
45. Id. at 278, 374 S.E.2d at 452.
46. Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. at 123, 362 S.E.2d at 587; Fogleman, 41 N.C.
App. at 598, 255 S.E.2d at 270.
1993]
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dent spouse constitutes a ground for alimony under Section 50-
16.2(10) of the North Carolina General Statutes."" The court
broadened the scope of this statute by deciding that absent a valid
separation agreement waiving alimony,48 post-separation failure to
support a dependent spouse is a sufficient independent ground for
alimony.49 This construction of the statute is not supported by cur-
rent legislative intent. First, by construing the North Carolina ali-
mony statutes in pari materia, it is clear that a supporting
spouse's fault or lack thereof is a key factor in determining an
award or denial of alimony. 0 Second, similar post-separation con-
duct has been excluded from consideration in determining grounds
for alimony. Finally, the state's interests against adultery that ap-
ply to upholding the sanctity of marriage are not comparable in a
failure to provide support context.
A. North Carolina Statutes 50-16.1 Through 50-16-10 Are to Be
Construed in Pari Materia
The courts have held that the statutes pertaining to alimony
are to be construed in pari materia.5 1 Applying the statutes to-
gether, it is clear that a spouse who brings the marriage to an end
by his or her own provocation should not be entitled to alimony,
or, at least, should be awarded less alimony than ordinarily would
be allowed if she or he had not contributed to the breakdown of
the marriage. 2 The Brown decision did not address this important
factor, and failed to acknowledge that the jury's findings supported
an inference of provocation, if not fault, on Mrs. Brown's part. Her
provocation of Mr. Brown's departure from the marriage tends to
negate her allegations of his fault in the breakdown of the mar-
riage. His subsequent failure to support her should be justified,
47. Brown v. Brown, 104 N.C. App. 547, 548, 410 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1991).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(b) (1987).
49. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 458, 410 S.E.2d at 225.
50. See supra notes 38, 41 and accompanying text.
51. Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 287 S.E.2d 840 (1982); Broughton v.
Broughton, 58 N.C. App. 778, 294 S.E.2d 772, petition denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299
S.E.2d 214 (1982).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2, 50-16.5 to -16.6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5(b)
states in material part, "... the fact that the dependent spouse has committed an
act or acts which would be grounds for alimony if such spouse were the support-
ing spouse shall be grounds for disallowance of alimony or reduction in the
amount of alimony when pleaded in defense by the supporting spouse," (emphasis
added). See also supra note 41.
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due to his lack of fault in the separation. Each question posed to
the jury asked whether the misconduct was justified, except the
question pertaining to his failure to provide support.5 3 Since the
statutes, considered together, compel a finding that the grounds
asserted in order to receive alimony should only be acts that are
not provoked or justified, then that finding should apply to each
enumerated ground, including a failure to support." Mr. Brown's
failure to support his wife after she provoked him to leave is justi-
fied by her provocation. 5
In addition to considering provocation issues in determining
the grounds for alimony, the statute offers measures that a spouse
may take to insure that the other spouse, who owes him or her a
duty to provide support, will continue to provide that support af-
ter the separation. This remedy takes the form of alimony
pendente lite." Upon Mr. Brown's leaving, Mrs. Brown had the
right to apply for such relief. In fact, she did apply for, and was
granted alimony pendente lite.57 This relief is the remedy allowed
to a dependent spouse who may have a right to alimony. By al-
lowing willful failure to support as a ground for alimony after sep-
aration, the court dispensed with the need for alimony pendente
lite actions.58 The practical effect of such a decision allows a poten-
tially dependent spouse to conveniently fail to apply for alimony
pendente lite and subsequently plead "willful failure to provide
support" in order to receive permanent alimony after final judg-
ment of absolute divorce. This result clearly obstructs the intent of
53. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 548, 410 S.E.2d at 224.
54. Some grounds may not be justifiable. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.2(2), (6). See also supra note 2 (text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2).
55. In deciding whether adequate grounds existed to award alimony, the
court in Pearce stated, "At no time does she allege that plaintiff's conduct was
without adequate provocation on her part. This averment is essential. Its omission
is fatal." Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 572, 35 S.E.2d 636, 637, (1945). See
generally Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 343 S.E.2d 559 (1986) (ali-
mony may be barred by showing both spouses have committed grounds for ali-
mony); Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App. 554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985) ("[a spouse] must
not have provoked the 'indignities' of which he complains"); Caddell v. Caddell,
236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923 (1953) (wife had the burden of proving that the sepa-
ration was wrongful in order to receive alimony). For cases denying alimony to
dependent spouses who abandoned the marriage see Parker v. Parker, 261 N.C.
176, 134 S.E.2d 174 (1964); Reece v. Reece, 232 N.C. 95, 59 S.E.2d 363 (1950).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (1987).
57. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 548, 410 S.E.2d at 224.
58. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussion of the purposes
of alimony pendente lite).
1993]
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both alimony pendente lite and permanent alimony.5 9
B. Similar Post-Separation Conduct Not Allowed as A Ground
for Alimony
Abandonment and constructive abandonment have both been
found to only relate to acts committed while the parties are living
together.6 0 Reasons supporting these findings are based on com-
mon sense. In alleging abandonment, a spouse must show that the
other spouse left him or her without consent, without intention of
renewing the relationship, and without adequate provocation."'
Abandonment is the separation, and therefore conduct after sepa-
ration cannot constitute abandonment. There cannot be separation
after the separation. Furthermore, the reasons for denying post-
separation grounds for alimony as to abandonment also apply to
constructive abandonment. In constructive abandonment, one
spouse may effectively separate himself or herself from the other
without leaving the marital home.6 2 This type of abandonment
may be evidenced by other misconduct, such as offering indignities
to the other spouse, or a willful failure to support the other spouse
while living together.6
Reasons similar to those in abandonment cases support the
exclusion of conduct which evidences an offer of indignities to the
spouse after separation. When a married couple separates, it is
often a stressful time filled with emotional turmoil and hostility.
To allow the "offering of indignities" '64 to be a ground for alimony
after the separation would be tantamount to allowing the separa-
tion itself, with nothing more, to be a ground for alimony. Parties
may separate for the same reasons that they may offer indignities
to each other after the separation. If some occurrence causes the
separation, that particular act may also cause the couple to offer
indignities to each other in the aftermath of the event. This is not
a ground for alimony. The indignities alleged must be a proximate
59. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text (discussion of the purposes
of permanent alimony).
60. Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. 119, 362 S.E.2d 584 (1987);
Fogleman v. Fogleman 41 N.C. App. 597, 255 S.E.2d 269 (1979).
61. Panhorst v. Panhorst, 277 N.C. 664, 668-69, 178 S.E.2d 387, 391 (1971).
62. Id. at 671, 178 S.E.2d at 392.
63. Id.
64. Presson v. Presson, 12 N.C. App. 109, 182 S.E.2d 614 (1971) (the term
has not been defined, and what constitutes "indignities" is determined on a case-
by-case basis).
[Vol. 15:333
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/5
GROUNDS FOR ALIMONY
cause of the separation,65 not a product of it.
Based on both the rationale for denying alimony in the post-
separation constructive abandonment context as well as the ration-
ale for denying alimony in the post-separation offer of indignities
context, post-separation willful failure to support a dependent
spouse should not be a ground for alimony. First, willful failure to
support a spouse relates closely to constructive abandonment. In
fact, failure to support can be an element of constructive abandon-
ment."6 Thus, it would defeat the effect of denying post-separation
abandonment as a ground for alimony if the spouse could merely
plead the elements of post-separation abandonment in substitu-
tion. Second, willful failure to support after separation may be the
product of a justified reason to separate, as made apparent by the
jury's findings in Brown." If the provocation to leave compels the
spouse to stop providing the support, it is the provocation that is
the proximate cause of both the marital breakdown and the failure
to support. Thus, the cessation of support should not subsequently
be construed as marital fault in order to justify an award of
alimony.
C. Misapplication of The Adams Rationale
The court relied on the rationale in Adams v. Adams6 to jus-
tify its finding that post-separation failure to support a dependent
spouse is a ground for alimony.69 The Adams court found that
post-separation adultery is a ground for alimony". However, the
rationale which supports post-separation adultery as a ground for
alimony does not apply to post-separation failure to support.
First, the Adams court's reasons for allowing post-separation
adultery to be a ground for alimony included the state's interest in
the sanctity of marriage and the continued hope for reconciliation
until the marriage legally terminates.7 1 Although these are valid in-
65. Fogleman, 41 N.C. App. at 598, 255 S.E.2d at 270.
66. BeaU v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407, (1976); Panhorst v. Panhorst,
277 N.C. at 671, 178 S.E.2d at 392; Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299, 305, 160 S.E.2d
13, 17 (1968); McDowell v. McDowell, 243 N.C. 286, 287, 90 S.E.2d 544, 545
(1955); Fogleman v. Fogleman, 41 N.C. App. 597, 600, 255 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1979);
Garner v. Garner, 10 N.C. App. 286, 287, 178 S.E.2d 94 (1970).
67. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 548, 410 S.E.2d at 224.
68. Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C. App. 274, 374 S.E.2d 450 (1988).
69. Brown, 104 N.C. App. at 550, 410 S.E.2d at 225.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 278, 374 S.E.2d at 452.
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terests, they do not apply to post-separation failure to support. If a
spouse commits adultery during the separation period, but before
the divorce, it will most likely have a detrimental effect on the pos-
sibility of the reconciliation. On the other hand, when a spouse de-
cides to stop supporting the other as a result of their separation,
such a detrimental effect on the possibility of reconciliation is not
likely. In the instance of adultery, such conduct may contribute to
the "finality of their break-up" $72 but in failing to support the de-
pendent spouse after the parties separate, there is no such contri-
bution. In the event of a reconciliation, a spouse who had failed to
provide support can resume that support with the resumption of
the marriage. Adultery, however, may not be so easily forgiven.
Second, while failure to support may be remedied by an appli-
cation for alimony pendente lite,73 no such preventative measures
may be taken to compel a spouse to refrain from adulterous con-
duct. In the alimony context, if the court finds that the supporting
spouse owes payments for a time period in which she or he did not
provide support, it can compel the spouse to make retroactive pay-
ments to the dependent spouse.7 4 There is no similar avenue
through which a spouse may offer to redress the harm caused by
adultery.
Finally, the court in Adams explicitly stated that "this case
does not involve and we do not decide whether any of the other
fault-based grounds in the post-separation context affects ali-
mony.175 This statement expresses the court of appeals' reluctance
to broaden the scope of the statute and apply other grounds simi-
larly. Due to the extreme religious, emotional, and moral beliefs
inherent in marital sexual conduct, adultery is given special treat-
ment in the divorce and alimony statutes. 7 1 It is often an exception
to the other rules and should be considered the exception in post-
separation grounds for alimony as well.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Court of Appeals broadened the scope of
acceptable grounds for alimony by including post-separation fail-
ure to support as such an acceptable ground. The decision in
72. Id.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.7 to -16.8 (1987).
74. Id.
75. Adams, 92 N.C. App. at 279, 374 S.E.2d at 452.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-7, 50-16.2, 50-16.5 - 50-16.6 (1987).
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GROUNDS FOR ALIMONY
Brown may result in courts now allowing any of the enumerated
grounds upon which alimony can be granted to be sufficient
whether it is pre- or post-separation. The implications behind the
court's decision tend to veer away from the current justifications
surrounding alimony awards. In the future, alimony may be
awarded with less scrutiny afforded to the alleged grounds.
While the facts of Brown involved an unemployed housewife,
easily identifiable as the dependent spouse, future cases may
award alimony to dependent spouses who are not so easily labeled.
In those cases where there is some question of whether the depen-
dent spouse will be deemed as such by the court, and where there
are no pre-separation grounds for alimony, this new rule may det-
rimentally affect the spouse who fails to recognize the potential
consequences of post-separation failure to support. Likewise, the
potentially dependent spouse may find an advantage in avoiding
alimony pendente lite. Absent determinative legislative action or a
North Carolina Supreme Court ruling on the issue, the Brown de-
cision, in its attempt to clarify the scope and purpose of North
Carolina's statutory grounds for alimony, has only added to the
confusion.
Elizabeth N. Rich
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